PUBLIC OFFICIALS-PENSIONS-DETERMINATION

OF DISHONORABLE SERVICE AS BASIS FOR BENEFIT FORFEITURE REQUIRES BALANCING APPROACH- Uricoli v. Board of Trustees, 91 N.J. 62, 449 A.2d

1267 (1982); Eyers v. Board of Trustees, 91 N.J. 51, 449 A.2d
1261 (1982).
Traditionally, New Jersey's public employees, particularly police

officers and firefighters, have not become eligible to receive pension
and related benefits unless they have rendered honorable service during their tenures in office. This principle was significantly modified by
the New Jersey Supreme Court's recent decisions in Uricoli v. Board of
TrusteesI and Eyers v. Board of Trustees. 2 The court held in Uricoli
that the accidental disability provision' of the Act establishing a police
and firemen's retirement fund 4 does not mandate automatic forfeiture
of benefits when an employee has been convicted of misconduct relating to the performance of his official duties. 5 Based upon its perception of the policies underlying the legislative provision of pensions for
public employees, the court adopted a balancing approach to ascertain any reduction of pension benefits and formulated guidelines to be
considered in future pension forfeiture cases. 6 In Eyers, the court
applied this balancing approach to determine whether survivor's benefits, payable under the public employee pension statute, should be
forfeited as a result of the employee's misconduct. 7 The Eyers court
went on to hold that the dependent widow of a public employee was
91 N.J. 62, 449 A.2d 1267 (1982).
2 91 N.J. 51, 449 A.2d 1261 (1982).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:16A-7 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); see inJra note 82 for partial
text of statute.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:16-1 to :16A-68 (West 1962 & Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 76, 449 A.2d at 1274. Misconduct in office sufficient to deny pension
benefits has been held to include malfeasance, see Fromm v. Board of Directors, 81 N.J. Super.
138, 195 A.2d 32 (App. Div. 1963) (ticket-fixing by policeman); nonfeasance, see Hozer v. State,
95 N.J. Super. 196, 230 A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1967) (policeman allowed known gambling
activities to continue over five year period); and moral turpitude, see Ballurio v. Castellini, 29
N.J. Super. 383, 102 A.2d 662 (App. Div. 1954) (city street department employee subject of
abortion charge).
8 Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 77-78, 449 A.2d at 1275. Public employees' pensions have generally
come to be considered provisions for financial security during retirement as well as inducements
to accept lower salaries than those available in the private sector. See generally Cohn, Public
Employee Retirement Plans- The Nature of Employees' Rights, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 32 (discussion
of bases for provision of pensions to public employees); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1964) (pensions and other governmental payments as forms of property or entitlements).
' Eyers, 91 N.J. at 55, 449 A.2d at 1263. Benefits were to be payable to a public employee's
surviving beneficiary under an option contained in the pension statute. Id. at 54, 449 A.2d at
1263; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A-50 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
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entitled to receive survivor's benefits despite the employee's conviction
for acts constituting dishonorable service.S
Eugene J. Uricoli was hired by the City of Orange as a patrolman
on November 14, 1952, and had advanced through the ranks of
sergeant, lieutenant, and detective to become chief of police in 1970. 9
A 1975 Special Grand Jury investigation of corruption in Orange's
municipal government resulted in Uricoli's indictment on eight counts
of alleged misconduct in office."' The indictments contained a variety
of charges, including illegally disposing of traffic tickets, unlawfully
influencing a subordinate officer to refrain from arresting gambling
suspects, and extortion." Uricoli was prosecuted for fixing a traffic
ticket and bill-padding, and pleaded not guilty to both counts. 12 On
April 9, 1976, Uricoli was found guilty on the ticket-fixing charge and
was given a one year suspended sentence and probation pending his
payment of a $1,000 fine.' 3 The trial judge suspended the jail term as
unnecessary for rehabilitation, deterrence, or punishment, finding
that Uricoli's loss of his position, combined with the damage to his
reputation, was a sufficient sanction. 14 Uricoli was removed from the
police force in June, 1976.15
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division affirmed the
conviction 1 and a petition for certification to the New Jersey Supreme

' Eyers, 91 N.J. at 62, 449 A.2d at 1267.
Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 64-65, 449 A.2d at 1268; Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certification at 1, Uricoli v. Board of Trustees [hereinafter cited as Brief in Opposition].
'" 91 N.J. at 82, 449 A.2d at 1278; Supplemental Brief on Behalf of Respondent- Respondent
at 3, Uricoli v. -Board of Trustees [hereinafter cited as Supplemental Brief].
" 91 N.J. at 82, 449 A.2d at 1278; Supplemental Brief, supra note 10, at 3. Uricoli was also
charged with attempting to persuade other members of the force to cover up matters under
investigation by the city prosecutor and with falsifying his expense account. Supplemental Brief,
supra note 10, at 3.
2 Supplemental Brief, supra note 10, at 3-4. Uricoli's trial on the charge of accepting money
from the city exterminator in a bill-padding scheme resulted in a hung jury. Id. at 4.
'3 91 N.J. at 65, 449 A.2d at 1268. Uricoli's contention that he did not profit monetarily from
the action was never disputed by the state. Id.
14

Id.

"5 Id. at 82, 449 A.2d at 1278; see Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 3. This action was
taken pursuant to a statutory provision that:
a. A person holding any public office, position, or employment, elective or
appointive, under the government of this State or any agency or political subdivision
thereof, who is convicted of an offense shall forfeit such office or position if:
(1) He is convicted under the laws of this State of an offense involving dishonesty or of a crime of the third degree or above . . .
(2) He is convicted of an offense involving or touching such office, position or
employment. ...
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:51-2 a.(1)-(2) (West 1982).
'" Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 3.
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Court was denied. 7 The United States District Court for the District
of New Jersey subsequently denied Uricoli's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, and no appeal was taken.1 8 All other indictments
against Uricoli were dismissed on February 1, 1979, after the prosecutor indicated that justice had been adequately served by Uricoli's
sentence for the ticket-fixing conviction, in conjunction with his removal from office and the loss of all pension benefits. 9
Uricoli submitted an application to the Board of Trustees of the
Police and Firemen's Retirement System (PFRS Board) on June 15,
1979, for accidental disability retirement benefits. 20 He based his
claim on various back injuries incurred between 1963 and 1972 during
ordinary police work. 2' The portion of the application completed by
the Orange Police Department regarding his salary level and length of
service indicated that Uricoli's employment had been terminated on
the basis of his indictment and conviction for malfeasance. 22 After
obtaining and reviewing copies of the indictment and the judgment of
conviction, 23 the PFRS Board in September of 1979 concluded that
Uricoli was ineligible for any retirement benefits since the conviction
24
rendered all of his service dishonorable.
Uricoli appealed the PFRS Board's decision, but an administrative law judge concluded that Uricoli's actions indeed constituted
dishonorable service,2 5 and thus warranted the forfeiture of his pension benefits. 26 In May of 1980, the PFRS Board adopted the determinations of the administrative law judge and reaffirmed its decision not
to process Uricoli's application. 27 The New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division upheld the PFRS Board's denial, reiterating that

"7
State v.

Uricoli, 75 N.J. 610, 384 A.2d 840 (1978).

"SBrief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 3.
11 91 N.J. at 82, 449 A.2d at 1278.
20 Id. at 65, 449 A.2d at 1269. These were the only retirement benefits for which Uricoli was
eligible since at the time of his dismissal he was 49 years of age and therefore did not meet the
minimum age requirements of any of the other pension provisions. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 43:16-1 to :16A-68 (West 1962 & Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
21 91 N.J. at 65, 440 A.2d at 1269.
22 Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 3.
23 Id.
24 91 N.J. at 65, 449 A.2d at 1269. The Board of Trustees made its determination without
considering the merits of Uricoli's application. Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 3.
25 Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 4. The court in Plunkett v. Board of Pension
Comm'rs, 113 N.J.L. 230, 173 A. 923 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd per curiam, 114 N.J.L. 273, 176 A.
341 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935), defined honorable service as "that [behavior] characterized by or in
accordance with principles of honor. One so serving is scrupulously upright, and shows a fine
regard for obligations as to conduct." Id. at 233, 173 A. at 924.
26 91 N.J. at 65, 449 A.2d at 1269.
27 Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 4; see also 91 N.J. at 65, 449 A.2d at 1269.
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the conduct of which Uricoli was convicted constituted dishonorable
service.28 Uricoli's petition for certification was granted by the New
Jersey Supreme Court, 29 which held that his misconduct was not
sufficiently egregious to render his twenty years of service so dishonorable as to require forfeiture of all pension benefits.30
The Uricoli court noted that judicial evolution of the forfeiture
doctrine had been a long, uneven process whereby the courts had
attempted to implement the shifting objectives of the legislature in
providing pensions to public employees. 3' A pension was traditionally
considered to be a gratuitous allowance, "a bounty springing from the
appreciation and graciousness of the sovereign." ' 32 In this context, the
courts viewed a pension as an incentive to persons employed in positions of public trust to maintain good conduct and to render efficient
service.33 Since a pension was considered a reward, it seemed only
logical that this reward could be withheld if all conditions for receiving it were not met by the employee. 34 According to the courts, a
primary condition for the grant of a public employee's pension was his
having rendered honorable service in his official capacity. 35 The accepted view was that benefits should be forfeited by those providing

28

Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 4; see also 91 N.J. at 65, 449 A.2d at 1269.

29 Uricoli v. Board of Trustees, 87 N.J. 404, 434 A.2d 1082 (1981).

10 91 N.J. at 78-79, 449 A.2d at 1275-76; see also infra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
31 91 N.J. at 67, 449 A.2d at 1269; see infra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
32 Hozer v. State, 95 N.J. Super. 196, 199, 230 A.2d 508, 510 (App. Div. 1967); Ballurio v.
Castellini, 29 N.J. Super. 383, 389, 102 A.2d 662, 666 (App. Div. 1954); see also Moran v.
Firemen's & Policemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 20 N.J. Misc. 479, 483, 28 A.2d 885, 888
(Hudson County Cir. Ct. 1942) (pension not contractual obligation but gratuitous allowance).
13 See Plunkett v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 113 N.J.L. 230, 233, 173 A. 923, 924 (Sup. Ct.
1934) (fundamental purpose of public pensions "is to secure good behavior and the maintenance
of reasonable standards of discipline during service"), aff'd per curiam, 114 N.J.L. 273, 176 A.
341 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935); see also Mount v. Trustees of the Pub. Employees' Retirem. Sys.,
133 N.J. Super. 72, 80-81, 335 A.2d 559, 564 (App. Div. 1975) (public pensions are "inducement
to conscientious, efficient and honorable service"); Hozer v. State, 95 N.J. Super. 196, 199, 230
A.2d 508, 510 (App. Div. 1967) (same); Ballurio v. Castellini, 29 N.J. Super. 383, 389, 102 A.2d
662, 666 (App. Div. 1954) (same).
14 See Walter v. Police & Fire Pension Comm'n, 120 N.J.L. 39, 42, 198 A. 383, 384 (Sup. Ct.
1938) (policeman's position and pension benefits forfeited by conviction for malfeasance in
office); accord Plunkett v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 113 N.J.L, 230, 233, 173 A. 923, 924
(Sup. Ct. 1934) ("[o]ne who embezzles funds entrusted to his care does not.., render the service
), afj'd per curiam, 114
that is an essential prerequisite to the awarding of a pension.
N.J.L. 273, 176 A. 341 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935).
15 See Mount v. Trustees of the Pub. Employees' Retirem. Sys., 133 N.J. Super. 72, 80, 335
A.2d 559, 564 (App. Div. 1975); see also Board of Trustees v. Board of Freeholders, 87 N.J.
Super. 187, 194, 208 A.2d 440, 443 (Law Div. 1965) (pension isreward for service), affd, 47
N.J. 132, 219 A.2d 526 (1966); Sganga v. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 2 N.J.
Super. 575, 579, 64 A.2d 650, 651-52 (Law Div. 1949) (pension is granted in recognition of
meritorious service).
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dishonorable service because providing pensions for such individuals
"would be to place a premium upon dishonesty and inefficiency." 36
In addition to viewing public pension rights as a reward, many
courts held that such rights, having been created by legislative enactments, were subject to legislative modification 37 and that employees
had no rights except those provided under the statute governing the
particular fund. 38 By contrast, the contractual nature of private plans
was viewed by the courts as permitting the vesting of a participant's
right to benefits upon his meeting the plan's requirements. 39 Such
vested rights could not be modified or abridged by unilateral discre40
tionary acts of the plan's managers or by the legislature.

31 Walter v. Police & Fire Pension Comm'n, 120 N.J.L. 39, 42, 198 A. 383, 384 (Sup. Ct.
1938).
11 See Spina v. Consolidated Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 41 N.J. 391, 197
A.2d 169 (1964) (legislative modification of pension statute not an abridgment of plan participants' contractual rights since no such rights existed); Laden v. Daly, 132 N.J.L. 440, 40 A.2d
780 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (statutory change in basis for receipt of disability pension while member's
application pending held valid), afJ'd per curiam, 133 N.J.L. 314, 44 A.2d 212 (Ct. Err. & App.
1945); Bader v. Crone, 116 N.J.L. 329, 184 A. 346 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (legislative increase in
deductions from pension benefits upheld).
3' This position was reaffirmed by the appellate court in Chausmer v. Commissioners of the
Employees' Retirem. Sys., 150 N.J. Super. 379, 375 A.2d 1205 (App. Div. 1977). The court held
that "[w]e have no legislative authority to expand the meaning and effect of the statute. This
court has noted the principle with respect to a pension statute that 'an employee has only such
rights and benefits as are based upon and within the scope of the provisions thereof.'" Id. at 383,
375 A.2d at 1207 (quoting Matthews v. Board of Educ., 31 N.J. Super. 292, 296-97, 106 A.2d
346, 348 (App. Div. 1954)).
11 Such a relationship arose only when the members' contributions were made on a voluntary
basis. The initial case in this area was Ball v. Board of Trustees, 71 N.J.L. 64, 58 A. 111 (Sup.
Ct. 1904), which viewed a teacher's voluntary contributions to a private annuity fund as creating
a contractual relationship with the fund's Board of Trustees. Id. at 66, 58 A. at 111-12. When
such contributions were compulsory, however, no such relationship existed. Pennie v,.
Reis, 132
U.S. 464 (1889), dealt with the issue of compulsory contributions to a policemen's life and health
insurance fund which was created to provide a cash payment upon death or upon retirement for
disability, but not pension benefits per se. Id. at 466. The Court refused to adopt a contract
theory and upheld the legislature's right to amend the plan prior to vesting. Id. at 471. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey subsequently expanded the Pennie rationale to include compulsory
payments to pension funds. See Spina v. Consolidated Police & Firemen's Pension Fund
Comm'n, 41 N.J. 391, 197 A.2d 169 (1964); see also Salley v. Firemen's & Policemen's Pension
Fund Comm'n, 124 N.J.L. 79, 11 A.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (compulsory contributions to pension
plan created no contractual rights in members); Walter v. Police & Fire Pension Comm'n, 120
N.J.L. 39, 198 A. 383 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (no vested right to pension); Bader v.Crone, 116 N.J.L.
329, 184 A. 346 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (same).
1o Ball v. Board of Trustees, 71 N.J.L. 64, 66, 58 A. 111, 112 (Sup. Ct. 1904). Although the
Board of Trustees in Ball had been created by legislative enactment, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that since the pension fund did not depend on state appropriations, an attempted
legislative modification was not supported by consideration and was therefore invalid. Id.
Private pension plans are now directly governed by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, which provides that benefits based upon employee contributions to the plans are
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Public employees' pension plans in New Jersey have never been
viewed as conferring the same type of nonforfeitable property rights
as private pension plans. Originally, the courts held that all public
employee pension benefits, even those directly attributable to the
employee's contributions, were forfeitable. 4' During the 1940's, however, the courts recognized that an employee had a property right in
any pension payment which had actually become payable; such right
42
could not be arbitrarily abrogated.
In 1955 the New Jersey Supreme Court initiated a change in the
manner in which public pensions were viewed by holding that a
public employee's pension was in the nature of deferred compensation
for past services. 43 In spite of this developing view that a public
pension was more than a mere gratuity, the courts refused to acknowledge public employees' expectations in their pension benefits as vested
property rights. 44 Nine years later the Supreme Court of New Jersey
expanded public employees' rights to their pension benefits by stating
that the employees' contributions constituted a property interest
which could not be confiscated by the state. 45 The court, however,
specifically rejected the argument that a contractual relationship existed between the plan and its members, since the existence of such a

not subject to forfeiture once vested, and that those based upon the employer's contributions are
lost for limited circumstances, none of which involve employee misconduct. An example would
be the employee's leaving his position prior to fulfilling length of service vesting requirements.
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 1053 (a)(D)(iii) (West 1975).
11 See Connelly v. Municipal Employees Pension Comm'n, 130 N.J.L. 101, 31 A.2d 488
(Sup. Ct. 1943). Connelly had been dismissed from his position as a clerk in a municipal finance
department for a conviction for false pretense. At that time there was a specific statutory
provision that refund of an employee's contributions to the pension fund was not to be made to
any employee who had been separated from service for charges which prohibited his reappointment. Id. at 102-03, 31 A.2d at 489; see N.J. REV. STAT. § 43:13-10 (1937).
41 See Sganga v. Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 2 N.J. Super. 575, 579, 64 A.2d
650, 652 (Law Div. 1949) ("right to a pension installment which has matured cannot be
denied"); Moran v. Firemen's & Policemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 20 N.J. Misc. 479, 483, 28
A.2d 885, 888 (Hudson County Cir. Ct. 1942) (vested right in due pension payments).
11 See Salz v. State House Comm'n, 18 N.J. 106, 112 A.2d 716 (1955). The court stated: "A
'pension' is a stated allowance or stipend in consideration of past services or of the surrender of
rights or emoluments to one retired from service." Id. at 112, 112 A.2d at 719.
11 See Pfitzinger v. Board of Trustees, 62 N.J. Super. 589, 163 A.2d 388 (Law Div. 1960).
Pfitzinger had applied for a service retirement pension while suspended on charges of misconduct
in office. Id. at 597, 163 A.2d at 392. He was found guilty on 26 of the charges, dismissed from
service, and denied any pension benefits. Id. at 592-97, 163 A.2d at 389-92. The court found no
merit in Pfitzinger's argument that his pension rights vested upon meeting the minimum statutory age and length of service requirements, stating that "'[had the Legislature intended to make
the vesting of a pension absolute or indefeasible as to persons having 20 years' service and had
[sic] reached retirement age they would have so provided." Id. at 601, 163 A.2d at 394.
" Spina v. Consolidated Police & Firemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 41 N.J. 391, 402, 197
A.2d 169, 175 (1964).
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relationship would prevent legislative modification, often necessary to
46
keep such plans solvent.
Throughout the development of the property right concept, the
courts consistently followed the view that the service rendered by an
employee must be honorable in order to merit receipt of the expected
benefits. 47 Although the requirement of honorable service was explicitly stated in only some of the New Jersey public pension statutes,
early decisions found the requirement to be implicit in all such legislation, 48 particularly when the affected employees were police or firemen. 49 Moreover, the courts developed the principle that conviction of
a public employee for a crime of moral turpitude or misconduct in
office rendered his service prima facie dishonorable, and resulted in
the loss of all pension benefits.50
41 Id. The plaintiffs in Spina argued that the 1952 amendment to N.J. REv. STAT. § 43:16-1
(1937) was an unconstitutional impairment of a contract created by the prior pension act which
had established certain retirement benefits under existing police and firemen's pension plans. Id.
at 393, 197 A.2d at 170. The court rejected the contractual argument, commenting that "[w]e
think there is no profit in dealing in labels such as 'gratuity,' 'compensation,' 'contract,' and
'vested rights.' None fits precisely, and it would be a mistake to choose one and be driven by that
choice to some inevitable consequence." Id. at 401, 197 A.2d at 174.
11 In Hozer v. State, 95 N.J. Super. 196, 230 A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1967), the court affirmed
an administrative determination by the Consolidated Police and Firemen's Pension Fund Commission which held that "appellant, even though he possessed the necessary age and service
requirements, did not satisfy the condition of 'honorable service' and therefore was not entitled
to a retirement pension." Id. at 200, 204, 230 A.2d at 511, 513; see also Fromm v. Board of
Directors, 81 N.J. Super. 138, 195 A.2d 32 (App. Div. 1963).
41 See Ballurio v. Castellini, 29 N.J. Super. 383, 102 A.2d 662 (App. Div. 1954), in which
Judge (later Justice) Francis examined the 60 public pension statutes in effect in 1954. Although
only nine of the statutes explicitly required honorable service, the court stated that "[c]onsideration of all these [pension] acts in the light of the sui generis character of a public pension
inevitably leads to the conviction that 'honorable' service is implicit in every such enactment."
Id. at 389, 102 A.2d at 666.
49 See Fromm v. Board of Directors, 81 N.J. Super. 138, 195 A.2d 32 (App. Div. 1963). The
court stated that a police officer " 'stands in the public eye as an upholder of that which is
morally and legally correct.' " Id. at 143, 195 A.2d at 34 (quoting In re Emmons, 63 N.J. Super.
136, 140, 164 A.2d 184, 187 (App. Div. 1960)).
SO See, e.g., Mount v. Trustees of the Pub. Employees' Retirem. Sys., 133 N.J. Super. 72, 85,
335 A.2d 559, 567 (App. Div. 1975). A worker's employment status at the time of conviction was
generally considered by the courts to be immaterial on the presumption that he had never gained
a vested interest in any greater portion of the pension than the installment or installments which
had become due and payable. See Moran v. Firemen's & Policemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 20
N.J. Misc. 479, 483, 28 A.2d 885, 888 (Hudson County Cir. Ct. 1942). The courts usually held
that the pension board therefore had the discretion to deny an applicant's benefits entirely, see
Plunkett v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 113 N.J.L. 230, 173 A. 923 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aJ'd per
curiam, 114 N.J.L. 273, 176 A. 341 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935), to suspend payment of benefits
already granted pending resolution of the question of honorable service, see Mount v. Trustees of
the Pub. Employees' Retirem. Sys., 133 N.J. Super. 72, 335 A.2d 559 (App. Div. 1975), or to
revoke previously granted pensions upon the employee's conviction for incidents constituting
misconduct in office or moral turpitude and occurring either prior or subsequent to the employ-
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Notwithstanding its traditional reluctance to formulate policy
regarding public employee pension forfeiture, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey in 1978 significantly modified its stance on this issue. In
Makwinski v. State, 51 the court held for the first time that even though
a public employee had been found guilty of misconduct directly related to his employment, total forfeiture of his pension benefits was
not required. 52 Makwinski involved a police chief who had become
chairman of a committee to repair the municipality's fire-damaged
Knights of Columbus hall. 53 The building was used free of charge by
various community organizations as well as by law enforcement
groups for in-service training sessions. In carrying out his function as
chairman of the repair committee, Makwinski utilized a police officer
as a carpenter during the officer's working hours. 54 The court held
that since the misconduct was not of a venal nature, it did not automatically render all of Makwinski's prior service dishonorable even
though the misconduct touched upon the administration of his office. 55 The court determined that since there had been no proof to the
contrary, all of Makwinski's service up to the date of the misconduct
had been honorable, and his pension benefits were to be granted on
that basis. 56 The court also held, however, that he would not be
permitted to collect pension benefits accruing for service rendered
after the date of the misconduct. 51 Judge Conford, in his concurrence,
maintained that the language of the applicable statute permitted
vesting of a policeman's pension upon his reaching the age of fifty-one
years and completing twenty-five years of honorable service. 5 Once
these criteria were met, he argued, any subsequent incident of misconduct could not impair the employee's right to his pension, at least
in relation to that portion represented by the qualifying term of
service. 59 Justice Clifford's strongly worded dissent supported the
ee's retirement, see Fromm v. Board of Directors, 81 N.J. Super. 138, 195 A.2d 32 (App. Div.
1963); Salley v. Firemen's & Policemen's Pension Fund Comm'n, 124 N.J.L. 79, 11 A.2d 244
(Sup. Ct. 1940).
,5 76 N.J. 87, 385 A.2d 1227 (1978).
51 Id. at 92, 385 A.2d at 1230.
53 Id. at 89, 385 A.2d at 1229.
54

Id.

11 Id. at 91, 385 A.2d at 1230.
56 Id. at 92, 385 A.2d at 1230.
57 Id.

58 Id. at 94, 385 A.2d at 1231 (Conford, J., concurring). The statute provided that '[a]ny
active member of a police department . . . who shall have served honorably in such department
for a period of twenty-five years and who has reached the age of fifty-one years shall, on his own
application, be retired on a service retirement pension .
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:16-1 (West
1962) (,-mended 1964).
" 76 N.J. at 94, 385 A.2d at 1231.
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lower court's adherence to the established forfeiture doctrine as being
in accord with legislative intent,6 0 and expressed the concern that the
decision, although limited in nature, would set an unfortunate precedent 61
Two years later the court was confronted with the companion
cases of Masse v. Board of Trustees62 and Procaccinov. State,6 3 which
dealt with the issue of forfeiture of public employee pension benefits
for crimes of moral turpitude and for malfeasance in office. Again, the
court departed from established precedent regarding the forfeiture of
public pension benefits. In Masse, the applicant pleaded guilty to two
counts of impairing the morals of a minor. According to the pension
4
board, this rendered all service to the date of the pleas dishonorable .
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court reversed the
board's decision, holding that since the misconduct was not job-related, it did not render Masse's service dishonorable and forfeiture was
not required. 65 The court reasoned that adding the civil penalty of
total forfeiture of pension benefits to the criminal sanctions already
imposed for the misconduct was harsh and arbitrary when the crime
itself was not related to the employment and did not constitute a
betrayal of the public trust. 6
The supreme court affirmed the appellate court's finding of honorable service. 67 The applicable criminal statutes required forfeiture
of public office and permanent disqualification from holding any
other such position only upon conviction of serious crimes or offenses
involving dishonesty or touching upon employment. 6 Therefore, the

Id. at 99, 385 A.2d at 1231 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Io
(1 Id. at 101, 385 A.2d at 1235 (Clifford, J., dissenting). The court limited its decision to the
case before it, considering Makwinski's intent to benefit the community as a primary factor in
deciding that he should retain a portion of his pension benefits. Id. at 91-92, 385 A.2d at 1230.
62 87 N.J. 252, 432 A.2d 1339 (1981).
63 87 N.J. 265, 432 A.2d 1346 (1981).
11 87 N.J. at 253-54, 432 A.2d at 1339-40. Masse pleaded guilty to charges brought pursuant
to a statute which provided that "[a]ny person who forces or induces any child under the age of
16 years to do or to submit to any act which tends to debauch the child or impair its morals, is
guilty of a misdemeanor." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:96-3 (West 1969), repealedby N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:98-2 (West 1982).
65 Masse v. Board of Trustees, 175 N.J. Super. 325, 333, 418 A.2d 1282, 1286 (App. Div.
1980), aff'd, 87 N.J. 252, 432 A.2d 1339 (1981).
66 Id. at 332-33, 418 A.2d at 1285-86. Masse was given a suspended sentence, required to
have psychiatric counseling and fined $1,000. Id. at 331-32, 418 A.2d at 1285.
67 87 N.J. at 254-56, 432 A.2d at 1340-41.
68 See id. at 262, 432 A.2d at 1344. The specific provision regarding disqualification mandates that:
c. [iun addition to the punishment prescribed for the offense, and the forfeiture
set forth in 2C:51-2 a., any person convicted of an offense involving or touching on
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court inferred that the legislature did not consider the total forfeiture
of pension benefits to be an appropriate sanction when the misconduct
was unrelated to employment. 69 Therefore, since Masse's misconduct
was neither dishonest nor related to his employment, the court
adopted the traditional position that remedial statutes, such as those
and affirmed
creating public pensions, should be construed liberally,
70
Masse's entitlement to his full pension benefits.
Procaccino involved an individual who held two state positions,
one full-time and one part-time. After he was convicted of misconduct
related to his state part-time job, 7' his application for a pension in
connection with his full-time employment with a different state
agency was denied by the pension board on the basis that his prior
conviction constituted dishonorable service, thereby rendering him
ineligible for any public pension. 72 The appellate division affirmed the
pension board's decision, 73 but the supreme court reversed, stating
that the applicant's conviction did not render him ineligible for pension benefits from his full-time employment.7 1 Since Procaccino's misconduct was unrelated to his full-time position and he had met the
length of service requirements, the court held that he was entitled to
have his application for pension benefits from that position processed
75
by the pension board.
Justice Clifford, in his dissent, objected to the majority's determination that the forfeiture doctrine requires a connection between the
employee's position and the conduct which constituted moral turpitude. 76 The dissent noted that the legislature had not modified the

his public office, position or employment shall be forever disqualified from holding
any office or position of honor, trust or profit under this State or any of its administrative or political subdivisions.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:51-2 c. (West 1982); see supra note 15 for the portion of N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:51-2 a. dealing with forfeiture of public office.
87 N.J. at 259, 262, 432 A.2d at 1342, 1344.
,o Id. at 264, 432 A.2d at 1345.
7 87 N.J. at 267, 432 A.2d at 1347.
72 Id. Procaccino was employed by the Mercer County, District Court as a constable on a
part-time basis from 1954 until he was discharged in 1977, and he subsequently pleaded guilty to
an indictment alleging misappropriation of funds collected by him in the course of his duties. Id.
at 267-68, 432 A.2d at 1347. He was given an 18 month suspended sentence and was required to
make restitution of the funds. Id. at 267, 432 A.2d at 1347.
73

Id.

74

Id. at 268, 432 A.2d at 1347.

Id.
78 See id. at 271, 432 A.2d at 1349 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford felt that
75

decisions regarding honorable service should be left to the legislature and that the holding of the
court represented "'quirky policy.'" Id. at 269, 432 A.2d at 1348 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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pension statutes to include the judicially developed requirement of
job-relatedness, despite ample opportunities to do so. 77 Therefore,
Justice Clifford asserted, the practice of imposing forfeiture of pension
benefits in all cases involving moral turpitude, regardless of jobrelatedness, had been implicitly approved by the legislature and
should have been applied in this case."' Justice Clifford concluded
with a call for legislative action to effect any reforms needed and
chided the majority for usurping the prerogative of the legislature.7 9
The Uricoli court, in light of these prior decisions, attempted to
formulate a comprehensive standard by which courts could determine
when forfeiture of a public employee's pension benefits would be
warranted. The court considered Uricoli's twenty years of honorable
service, the fact that there was no continuing course of criminal
conduct, that the misconduct did not result in personal gain, and that
adequate alternative sanctions had already been implemented. It concluded that Uricoli's entire tenure was not rendered dishonorable. 80
The court also determined, however, that Uricoli would not receive
pension benefits for service rendered in the years following the date of
8
his misconduct. '
Uricoli first argued that honorable service was not a prerequisite
to the granting of the pension benefits for which he was eligible since
the applicable statute did not contain an explicit honorable service
requirement. 82 The court rejected this assertion, relying on precedent
" See id. at 272, 432 A.2d at 1349-50 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
78
79

Id.
Id. at 274-75, 432 A.2d at 1350-51 (Clifford, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that:
[p]ension laws are peculiarly the prerogative of the Legislature. If drastic
revisions are to be made in this area because of changing notions of the purpose to be
served by public employee pensions, then those revisions should be wrought in
another forum. It is one thing for the Court to disagree with the Legislature, to
conclude that the body has acted unwisely, and then to seek to persuade by reasoned
analysis. It is quite another thing to trespass boldly into the territory of legislative
dominion by rewriting the settled and accepted law.

Id.
91 N.J. at 79, 449 A.2d at 1276.
81 Id.
82 91 N.J. at 66, 449 A.2d at 1269; see supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. The
applicable pension statutes provided:
[a]ny member of such police or paid or part-paid fire department who shall
have received permanent disability . . . shall be retired upon an accidental disability
pension equal to 2/3 of his average salary if an application for such retirement is filed
• . . within 5 years . ...
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:16-2 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
(1) Upon the written application by a member in service, by one acting in his
behalf or by his employer any member may be retired, . . . on an accidental
disability retirement allowance; provided, that the medical board . . . shall certify
80

NO TE
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establishing honorable service as an implicit prerequisite to receiving
any public pension.13 The Uricoli court viewed the issue before it as
requiring a weighing of the seriousness of the misconduct against the
harshness of depriving Uricoli of all pension benefits for which he was
eligible as a result of his substantial number of years of unblemished
service.

84

Justice Handler began by describing the original judicial formulation of the forfeiture doctrine as an attempt to effectuate the courts'
perception of legislative intent, noting that the evolution of the forfeiture doctrine into an integral part of New Jersey's public pension
system was the direct result of the various courts' changing views of
legislative policy in the area.8 5 He pointed out that a number of prior
cases required the automatic forfeiture of pension benefits for any
instance of misconduct in office.8 6 The court also noted, however, that
other courts had evaluated the nature of the misconduct in relation to
the employee's official duties when considering the need for total
forfeiture of pension benefits.8 7 Misconduct touching upon the administration of the employee's duties or instances of moral turpitude were
often seen as justifying the forfeiture of pension benefits.8 , The court
observed, however, that recent decisions had adopted a more flexible
approach in determining the nature of the misconduct which would
require forfeiture in a given case. 80 Justice Handler noted that, for
example, the court had held in both Masse and Procaccino that for-

that the member is permanently and totally disabled . . . The application to
accomplish such retirement must be filed within 5 years of the original traumatic
event ....

N.J.

43:16A-7(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
Id. at 66 & n.1, 449 A.2d at 1269 & n.1 (citing Masse, 87 N.J. at 252, 432 A.2d at 1339;
Makwinski, 76 N.J. at 87, 385 A.2d at 1227).
84 91 N.J. at 66, 449 A.2d at 1269.
85 Id. at 67-69, 449 A.2d at 1269-71. The court noted that public employees occupy positions
of trust which include a duty to the public to serve honorably. Id. at 69-70, 449 A.2d at 1271. A
breach of that duty, the court maintained, should warrant forfeiture of pension benefits. Id. at
70, 449 A.2d at 1271.
88 91 N.J. at 67, 449 A.2d at 1269-70 (citing Plunkett v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 113
N.J.L. 230, 173 A. 923 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aJJ'dper curiam, 114 N.J.L. 273, 176 A. 341 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1935); Fromm v. Board of Directors, 81 N.J. Super. 138, 195 A.2d 32 (App. Div. 1963)).
87 91 N.J. at 68, 449 A.2d at 1270; compare Plunkett v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 113
N.J.L. 230, 173 A. 923 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (fireman's embezzlement from relief fund warranted
dismissal and loss of pension benefits), affd per curiam, 114 N.J.L. 273, 176 A. 341 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1935) and Pfitzinger v. Board of Trustees, 62 N.J. Super. 589, 163 A.2d 388 (Law Div.
1960) (numerous infractions by employee required total forfeiture of pension benefits) with
Makwinski, 76 N.J. at 87, 385 A.2d at 1227 (nonvenal misconduct does not warrant forfeiture);
see also supra notes 51-79 and accompanying text.
88 See 91 N.J. at 68, 449 A.2d at 1270; supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
89891 N.J. at 68-69, 449 A.2d at 1270-71; see supra notes 51-79 and accompanying text.
STAT. ANN. §

13
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feiture was inappropriate unless there was a direct connection between the misconduct and the employee's position.9" In addition, the
Makwinski court had accorded substantial weight to the employee's
intent, holding that in spite of the direct relationship between
Makwinski's misconduct and his official duties, total forfeiture was
not warranted since the motivation for the misconduct was not venal. 9" '
The Uricoli court observed that earlier decisions had emphasized
the fiduciary relationship which existed between the public employee
and the public. Those cases had found an honorable service requirement implicit in that relationship, and viewed meeting this requirement as a prerequisite to the employee's eligibility for a pension from
the state. 2 The court also recognized that public pensions were gratuitous in nature and were intended to serve as both an incentive for the
employee to provide honorable service and as a deterrent against
misconduct.9 3 Justice Handler noted that if denial of those benefits
was to be used to promote honorable service in public office, no
contractual entitlement to the receipt of public pension benefits could
exist.9 4 The court also observed that certain jurisdictions regarded
public pensions as deferred compensation,9 5 thereby rendering those
pensions contractual in nature and hence forfeitable only upon a
specific legislative mandate to that effect.9 6 Since the New Jersey
90 91 N.J. at 69, 449 A.2d at 1270-71; see also Masse, 87 N.J. at 264, 432 A.2d at 1345;
Procaccino, 87 N.J. at 268, 432 A.2d at 1347.
9' 91 N.J. at 69, 449 A.2d at 1271; see also Makwinski, 76 N.J. at 91-92, 385 A.2d at 1230.
92 91 N.J. at 69-70, 449 A.2d at 1271 (citing Plunkett v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 113
N.J.L. 230, 173 A. 923 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aJfd per curiam, 114 N.J.L. 273, 176 A. 341 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1935)).
93 91 N.J. at 70, 449 A.2d at 1271 (citing Ballurio v. Castellini, 29 N.J. Super. 383, 102 A.2d
662 (App. Div. 1954); Hozer v. State, 95 N.J. Super. 196, 230 A.2d 508 (App. Div. 1967); Mount
v. Trustees of the Pub. Employees' Retirem. Sys., 133 N.J. Super. 72, 335 A.2d 559 (App. Div.
1975)); Masse, 87 N.J. at 252, 432 A.2d at 1339; see supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
94 91 N.J. at 70, 449 A.2d at 1271. The possibility of a contractual relationship between the
employee and the state, however, had been noted as a competing concept by the court in Watt v.
Mayor of Franklin, 21 N.J. 274, 121 A.2d 499 (1956), wherein the court observed that:
[t]he basic philosophy underlying pensions to public officers fluctuates between the
early view that they were mere gratuities bestowed by the sovereign in recognition of
meritorious service previously rendered and the more modern concept that they are
some form of delayed wages or salary to compensate the employee during his
declining years . . . for his long and faithful service.
Id. at 279, 121 A.2d at 501 (quoted in Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 70, 449 A.2d at 1271); see supra notes
37-39 and accompanying text.
" 91 N.J. at 71, 449 A.2d at 1272 (citing Willens v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications,
10 Cal. 3d 451, 516 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1973); Dorsey v. State, 283 A.2d 834 (Del.
1971)).
96 91 N.J. at 71, 449 A.2d at 1272 (citing Burello v. Commonwealth, 49 Pa. Commw. 364,
411 A.2d 852 (Commw. Ct. 1980); City of Frederick v. Quinn, 35 Md. App. 626, 371 A.2d 724
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Supreme Court had adopted neither the contractual nor the gratuity
theory exclusively, the Uricoli court concluded that, when determining the extent of pension forfeiture required in cases involving misconduct of public employees, the proper approach was "one which incorporates and reflects the statutory purposes served by public
pensions.

' '1 7

In determining those statutory purposes, Justice Handler first
observed the growing judicial recognition that public employee pensions were not mere gratuities, but were rather intended by the legislature as a form of deferred compensation. 98 He noted further that
public pensions are terms and conditions of employment which, by
statute, cannot be altered through collective employment negotiations.9 9 The court inferred from this exemption a legislative intent to
provide public employees with financial stability and security. 0 0
The court next examined the manner in which the legislature had
expressly dealt with pension forfeitures, in order to guide its interpretation of the lawmakers' intent where the statutes were silent on the
subject.' 0' The majority noted that the Public Employees' Retirement
System Act specifically provides for forfeiture of early retirement

(Ct. Spec. App. 1979); Leonard v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 479, 503 P.2d 741 (1972)); see
infra note 163 and accompanying text.
97 91 N.J. at 72. 449 A.2d at 1272-73. Justice Schreiber, in Masse, discussed the legislative
and judicial bases for considering public employee pension benefits as a form of compensation.
87 N.J. at 260-62, 432 A.2d at 1344; accord Chamber of Commerce v. Leone, 141 N.J. Super.
114, 137, 357 A.2d 311, 324 (Ch. Div. 1976) (legislators' retirement benefits earned by service in
office), aff'd per curiam, 75 N.J. 319, 382 A.2d 381 (1978); see Spina, 41 N.J. 391, 401, 197 A.2d
169, 174 (1964); see also supra note 43 and accompanying text. He also pointed out, however,
that the legislature had provided forfeiture of position and disqualification from governmental
employment as sanctions for public employee misconduct. 87 N.J. at 262, 432 A.2d at 1344; N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:51-2 a and c. (West 1982), supra notes 15 and 68. Justice Schreiber believed
that these sanctions evidenced a legislative policy that job-related misconduct of public employees warranted more severe punishment than similar infractions by others. 87 N.J. at 262, 432
A.2d at 1344.
11 91 N.J. at 72, 449 A.2d at 1273. Justice Handler referred specifically to Justice Schreiber's
discussion in Masse of the legislative policies behind the public pension statutes. See supra notes
68-70 and accompanying text.
11 91 N.J. at 73, 449 A.2d at 1273. The New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.1-21 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984), states, in pertinent part: "Nothing
in this act shall be construed to annul or modify. . . any pension statute or statutes of this State."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-8.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
1o091 N.J. at 73, 449 A.2d at 1273. The court stated that:
[i]t may be inferred that the removal of public pensions from the arena of mandatory
negotiations .. . not only protects the fiscal integrity of the pension systems but
assures public employees that their entitlement to pension benefits is secure and
should not be threatened by the vagaries of labor negotiations.
Id.
101Id.
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benefits upon an employee's removal from office for misconduct,102
and that the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice mandates removal
of an employee from his position and permanent disqualification from
holding any future governmental position upon conviction for specified types of misconduct.10 3 The court therefore concluded that, since
the legislature had elsewhere provided sanctions for the misconduct of
public employees, it should not construe the section of the pension
statutes applicable to this case as mandating automatic forfeiture
0 4
when the legislature had not expressly so provided.1
The court advanced two additional statutory construction arguments against forfeiture. First, the court asserted that as forfeiture is
essentially a penalty, doubts regarding its application must be resolved in favor of the employee. 10 5 Second, the majority maintained
that since a pension is basically remedial in nature, the pension statutes must be construed liberally in favor of their intended beneficiaries. 0 6 Justice Handler further maintained that the court, in determining the underlying legislative intent, could properly consider both
legislative and public policy developments since the original statute
was enacted. 0 7 He pointed out that there was no basis for inferring
that an inflexible forfeiture rule was consistent with the legislative
intent in providing public pensions, and that such an approach was
"discordant with the times." 108 The court thus held that a flexible,
equitable approach must be utilized in ascertaining whether total
102Id. at 74, 449 A.2d at 1273. Early retirement benefits are specifically denied to members of
PERS who are "remov[ed] for cause on charges of misconduct or delinquency." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 43:15A-38 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); accord N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:16A-11.2 (West Cum.
Supp. 1983-1984) (dealing specifically with policemen and firemen).
10' 91 N.J. at 75, 449 A.2d at 1273; see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:51-2 a. and c. (West 1982); see
supra notes 15 and 68 for text.
104 91 N.J. at 76, 449 A.2d at 1274.
105 Id., 449 A.2d at 1275; see Stapleton v. Two Million Four Hundred Thirty-Eight Thousand, One Hundred and Ten Dollars, 454 F.2d 1210, 1216 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Stapleton v. United States, 409 U.S. 894 (1972); State v. LaBella, 88 N.J. Super. 330, 338, 212
A.2d 192, 196 (Law Div. 1965).
106 91 N.J. at 76, 449 A.2d at 1275; see Masse, 87 N.J. at 259, 432 A.2d at 1339; supra notes
64-70 and accompanying text; Smith v. Consolidated Police & Firemen's Pension, 149 N.J.
Super. 229, 373 A.2d 685 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 8, 379 A.2d 239 (1977); In re
Vaccora, 131 N.J. Super. 264, 268, 329 A.2d 567, 569 (App. Div.), afj'd per curiam, 66 N.J. 151,
329 A.2d 555 (1974); In re Application of Smith, 57 N.J. 368, 374, 273 A.2d 24, 28 (1971);
Geller v. Department of the Treasury, 53 N.J. 591, 597-98, 252 A.2d 393, 396 (1969).
107 91 N.J. at 77, 449 A.2d at 1275. This approach, he noted, was particularly relevant when
it is reasonable for the court to believe that the legislature did not intend the statute to be isolated
from changes. See Renz v. Penn Central Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 435 A.2d 540 (1981) (Railroad
Immunity Act strictly construed in light of abrogation of common law concept of contributory
negligence).
10191 N.J. at 77, 449 A.2d at 1275.
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forfeiture is justified by all the facts of an individual case, even in
those situations where the misconduct touches upon the administration of the employee's duties. 0 9 The court enumerated specific factors
to be considered in the weighing process including length of service,
the nature of the misconduct, and the availability of other sanctions. 10 Applying those factors to the instant case, the court determined that total forfeiture of benefits was not warranted, and the case
was remanded to the pension board with instructions to process Uricoli's application."'
In his concurrence, Justice Pashman noted that pensions were no
longer considered gratuities, but instead had become recognized as
necessary for the support of public employees and their families during retirement." 2 Total forfeiture of such benefits, he maintained,
would be an extreme punishment if it were imposed as a result of
relatively minor infractions." 3 He observed, however, that indefeasibly vested pensions would unjustly reward public employees who had
seriously abused the public trust by committing misconduct while in
office. 1 4 Justice Pashman believed that the factually oriented approach proposed by the majority was the best way to resolve these
conflicting considerations and that the standards developed would
enable future courts to make reasonable decisions regarding forfeiture
of pension benefits for dishonorable service. "5

109 Id,

91 N.J. at 77-78, 449 A.2d at 1275-76. The factors which may be considered are:
(1) the employee's length of service; (2) the basis for retirement, i.e., age, service,
disability, etc.; (3) the extent to which the employee's pension has vested; (4) the
duties of the particular employment; (5) the employee's public employment history
and record; (6) the employee's other public employment and service; (7) the nature
of the misconduct or crime, including the gravity or substantiality of the offense,
whether it was a single or multiple offense and whether it was continuing or isolated;
(8) the relationship between the misconduct and the employee's public duties; (9) the
quality of moral turpitude or the degree of guilt and culpability, including the
employee's motives and reasons, personal gain, and the like; (10) the availability and
adequacy of other penal sanctions; and (11) other personal circumstances relating to
the employee bearing upon the justness of forfeiture.
Id. at 77, 449 A.2d at 1275-76.
"I Id. at 78-79, 449 A.2d at 1276.
112 Id. at 80, 449 A.2d at 1276-77 (Pashman, J., concurring).
"'
Id., 449 A.2d at 1277 (Pashman, J., concurring). For example, strict application of the
forfeiture doctrine would theoretically exact the same penalty for ticket-fixing as for theft, arson
or murder.
114 Id.
"5 Id. at 80-81, 449 A.2d at 1277 (Pashman, J., concurring). Justice Schreiber, also concurring, pointed out that the only pension benefits for which Uricoli was eligible to apply were
based on disability because he did not have either the requisite age or length of service for a
regular pension at the time of his misconduct. Id. at 81, 449 A.2d at 1277 (Schreiber, J.,
110
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Justice O'Hern, joined by Chief Justice Wilentz and Justice Clifford, dissented, expressing the opinion that honorable service remained an implicit prerequisite for the granting of any public employee's pension benefits.l1 6 The dissent reaffirmed the court's reasoning in
Masse and Procaccino that the pension rights of public employees
were not subject to forfeiture so long as the misconduct was unrelated
to the employee's position.' 7 Justice O'Hern maintained, however,
that the fixing of a traffic ticket touched directly upon the administration of Uricoli's office and, as a fraud against the state, constituted an
act of moral turpitude. I 8 He argued that the case before the court was
readily distinguishable from Makwinski, which was unique in that it
concerned misconduct performed for the general good of the community."19
Although the dissent acknowledged that forfeiture of Uricoli's
pension benefits would result in personal suffering, Justice O'Hern
saw no reason to forsake the forfeiture precedent when a nexus existed
between the misconduct and the employee's duties. 20 He noted that
the forfeiture provisions of the criminal statutes, upon which both the
Masse and the Procaccinocourts had relied, supported the conclusion
that the legislature intended to impose harsher sanctions on public
employees committing employment-related misconduct than on those
employees guilty of offenses unrelated to their duties.' 2' The dissent
also pointed out that Justice Pashman's concurrence in Makwinski, in
concluding that "dishonorable service requires total forfeiture of pension rights,"'' 22 had stressed the " 'paramount importance of public
concurring). Since his service had been honorable up to the time of the misconduct, Justice
Schreiber believed that Uricoli was eligible to apply for disability benefits at any time up to that
point. Id.
116 Id. at 82-83, 449 A.2d at 1278 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 83, 449 A.2d at 1278-79 (O'Hern, J., dissenting); see supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
.. 91 N.J. at 83-84, 449 A.2d at 1279 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 84, 449 A.2d at 1279 (O'Hern, J., dissenting); see supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
12o 91 N.J. at 84-85, 449 A.2d at 1279 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
121 See 91 N.J. at 85, 449 A.2d at 1279-80 (O'Hern, J., dissenting); Masse, 87 N.J. at 262, 432
A.2d at 1344; see supra note 15 for text of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:51-2 a. (West 1982) (forfeiture
of position required for conviction of misconduct).
121 91 N.J. at 85, 449 A.2d at 1280 (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (quoting Makwinski, 76 N.J. at 93,
385 A.2d at 1231); see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. The Public Employees
Retirement System Act provides for the vesting of either certain benefits, or a deferred retirement
allowance, upon completion of 10 years of service. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A-38 (West Cum.
Supp. 1983-1984). The Police and Firemen's Retirement System Act does not explicitly allow
vesting of benefits, although the statute does provide for benefits similar to those available under
the Public Employees Retirement System Act, after 10 years of service. N.J. STAT. ANN. §
43:16A-11.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984). Both Acts specifically disallow such benefits, how-
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employees acting honestly in accordance with the public trust placed
in them.' "123 Justice O'Hern expressed the further concern that the
majority's balancing process afforded pension boards too much discretion in determining an employee's eligibility for public pension benefits. 124 The dissenters would have upheld the lower court's finding that

Uricoli's misconduct had rendered his service dishonorable, and thus
made him ineligible for any public pension.

125

Eyers v. Board of Trustees, decided on the same day as Uricoli, 2
presented the court with the related problem of determining the
extent of forfeiture of survivor's benefits called for when the deceased
pensioner was a public employee who had committed misconduct in
office.127 Roger F. Eyers had been employed as a plumbing inspector
by Parsippany-Troy Hills Township on both a part-time and a fulltime basis for a total of thirty-eight years. 28 At the age of sixty-nine he
applied for and was granted a regular service retirement pension,
which began in February of 1976.129 Mr. Eyers was subsequently
indicted for his part in certain incidents constituting misconduct in
office which had occurred between April 1974 and June 1975.130 The
indictment resulted in convictions on all counts, and, in 1978, Mr.
Eyers was sentenced to one year in prison (suspended), two years'
3
probation, and a $3,000 fine.1 1
During the course of the trial proceedings Eyers was notified by
the Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System
(PERS Board) of a pending hearing on the suspension of his retirement
benefits, but he died before the hearing took place. 32 Mr. Eyers had
ever, when the employee has been "remov[ed] for cause on charges of misconduct or delinquency.'" N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A-38 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); accord N.J. STAT. ANN. §
43:16A- 11.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984).
123 91 N.J. at 85, 449 A.2d at 1280 (O'Hern, J.. dissenting) (quoting Makwinski, 76 N.J. at 93,
385 A.2d at 1231).
124 See 91 N.J. at 84, 449 A.2d at 1279 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). The boards of trustees of New
Jersey's public pension funds exercise powers which are quasi-judicial in nature in that they have
the responsibility of processing applications for pension benefits, which includes the determination of the honorableness of an applicant's service as well as examining his general qualifications
for benefits. See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:1-1 to 43:22-15 (West 1962 & Cum. Supp.
1983-1984).
25 91 N.J. at 85, 449 A.2d at 1280 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
"2' 91 N.J. at 51, 449 A.2d at 1261.
127 Id. at 55-56, 449 A.2d at 1264.
12sId. at 53, 449 A.2d at 1262.
129

1d.

130Id. The indictment charged that Evers had accepted bribes to ignore plumbing violations.
One count was for misconduct in office, and the remaining three counts were for taking money
unlawfully. Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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opted for a retirement benefit plan which provided that his designated
beneficiary should receive both a lump sum and an annual survivor's
benefit upon his death. 33 The PERS Board determined that Blanche
T. Eyers, his widow and designated beneficiary, was not entitled to
any survivor's benefits since her husband's conviction had rendered his
service dishonorable, and thus would have disqualified him from
34
receiving the pension upon which her benefits claim was founded. 1
At a subsequent hearing, an administrative law judge decided
that Mrs. Eyers should not be required to forfeit her survivor's benefits, even though her husband's service had been rendered dishonorable by his conviction. 35 The PERS Board, however, rejected the
finding of the administrative law judge, reasserting that Roger Eyers'
ineligibility to continue receiving his pension eliminated his designated beneficiary's survivorship rights. 3 The appellate division, in
affirming the PERS Board's decision, held that an employee must
render honorable service throughout the term of employment in order
to be entitled to a public pension. 137 Since Mr. Eyers' conviction of
misconduct in office had thus rendered his right to pension benefits
nonexistent, the appellate division concluded that Mrs. Eyers had no
basis for a claim to survivor's benefits. 138 Her petition for certification
was granted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, which reversed the
39
appellate division.
Justice Handler, writing for the court, based his analysis on the
conclusion reached in Uricoli that a public employee's job-related
misconduct does not automatically result in the forfeiture of all pen140
sion benefits unless the applicable statute specifically so provides.
The court, however, did not specifically address the question of
whether Roger Eyers would have lost his pension benefits due to his

133

Id. at 54, 449 A.2d at 1263. Eyers had selected Option 2 under the statute which provided

"'[u]pon [the member's] death, his retirement allowance shall be continued throughout the life of
and paid to such person as he shall nominate .
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A-50 (West Cum.
Supp. 1983-1984) (emphasis added).
134 91 N.J. at 54, 449 A.2d at 1263.
135 Id.
136 Id.

Id. at 54-55, 449 A.2d at 1263; see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
91 N.J. at 55, 449 A.2d at 1263.
139 Id. at 55, 58, 449 A.2d at 1263, 1265.
140 Id. at 55, 449 A.2d at 1263. Justice Handler admitted that Eyers' conviction was for a
continuing course of conduct which involved a venal motive and which directly touched upon
the administration of his office. He also pointed out, however, that the incidents had occurred at
the end of a long career in public service unmarred by any other instance of wrongdoing, that
Eyers had already retired and was receiving pension benefits, and that a hearing had never been
held to determine whether his conduct warranted the loss of those benefits. Id.
137
138
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misconduct, but rather focused on whether the survivor's benefits
payable to his widow should be subject to forfeiture.'14 Presented with
such an issue, the court refused to hold that a survivor's benefits were
directly dependent upon the pensioner's rights, stating that the proper
approach to be taken in all pension forfeiture cases was "to balance
and weigh all relevant considerations, with none being determinative." 1 42 Since the benefits
in question here were not those of the
"errant employee," 143 but rather those of his dependent spouse, Justice
Handler decided that several additional factors would have to be
44
considered in applying the Uricoli balancing test in this case.1
The Eyers court first noted that, as previously discussed in Uricoli, the traditional goals of the forfeiture doctrine were to deter
45
misconduct in office and to punish betrayals of the public trust.
Justice Handler observed that since Mr. Eyers had already died, the
forfeiture of pension benefits in this case could not serve either the
goal of punishment, or of individual deterrence. 46 Although the forfeiture of Mrs. Eyers' survivor's benefits still might serve to deter other
potential wrongdoers, the court stated that this goal must be weighed
against other public policy considerations raised by the fact that the
1 47
intended beneficiary here was a dependent widow.
The fact that several New Jersey statutes specifically provide
benefits for the surviving family members of public employees148 led
the court to conclude that there is a strong legislative policy in favor of
ensuring the financial protection of "those most likely to be dependent
upon a public employee."' 149 Although Mr. Eyers did not have to
designate a dependent as his beneficiary, Justice Handler stated that
Eyers' decision to do so was a circumstance which had to be considered in determining the propriety of applying the forfeiture doc-

141
142

143
144

91 N.J. at 55-56, 449 A.2d at 1263-64.
Id. at 56, 449 A.2d at 1264.

Id.
Id.

"5' Id.; see supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text for a general discussion of the goals of the
forfeiture doctrine.
146 91 N.J. at 56, 449 A.2d at 1264.
147 Id.
"I Id. at 56-57, 449 A.2d at 1264-65; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A-49 (West Cum. Supp.
1983-1984) (benefits to spouse or other dependents where public employee suffers accidental
death while on duty); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:16-4 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) (dependent's
benefits where employee loses life while on duty); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:16A-12.1 (West Cum.
Supp. 1983-1984) (increased pension benefits to widows and dependents of public employees);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:16A-9, :16A-10 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) (allowance to beneficiaries
where employee dies either on duty or while in service).
19 91 N.J. at 57, 449 A.2d at 1264-65.
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trine. 50 The court held, therefore, that given the strong legislative
concern with providing support for dependents of public employees,
the inequity of requiring Mrs. Eyers to forfeit her survivor's benefits
outweighed any possible benefit which might be derived from the
general deterrence aspect of the forfeiture doctrine.15' Accordingly,
the decision of the appellate division was reversed and the matter
remanded for a determination of Mrs. Eyers' survivor's benefits based
152
upon Mr. Eyers' term of service up to the date of his misconduct.
Justice O'Hern, again joined by Chief Justice Wilentz and Justice
Clifford, dissented for the same reason that he had in Uricoli: He
adhered to the general rule that "[m]isconduct in office involving
dishonorable service should result in a forfeiture of vested pension
rights." 5 3 The fact that Eyers was already receiving retirement benefits when his misconduct came to light was not sufficient to distinguish
this case from Uricoli, according to Justice O'Hern, because it is clear
under New Jersey law that the granting of a pension is a decision that
may be reconsidered by a pension board. 5 4 The dissent maintained
that, since Eyers' pension would have been revoked had the PERS
Board held a hearing on the matter, there was no logical reason to
allow his widow to collect survivor's benefits based on that pension
merely because her husband's death had prevented the hearing from
taking place.1 5 As stated by Justice O'Hern, "[a] dependent beneficiary has no greater right to a pension than the member who desig56
nated the beneficiary." 1
Id.
"I' See id. at 58, 449 A.2d at 1265.
"2 Id. Justice Pashman's concurrence consisted merely of a reference to his concurring opinion
in Uricoli. See also Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 80, 449 A.2d at 1276-77 (Pashman, J., concurring); supra
text accompanying notes 112-15. Justice Schreiber also concurred, stating that since Eyers would
have been eligible for a pension had he retired immediately prior to his misconduct in 1974, the
pension should be seen as having vested as of that date. 91 N.J. at 58-59, 449 A.2d at 1265
(Schreiber, J., concurring), Justice Schreiber would thus have reached the same result as the
majority without having to reject the view that Mrs. Eyers' benefits were derived from those of
her husband. Id.
"1 91 N.J. at 59, 449 A.2d at 1265 (O'Hern, J., dissenting); see supra notes 32-36, 47-50 and
accompanying text.
4 See 91 N.J. at 59, 449 A.2d at 1265 (O'Hern, J., dissenting); Plunkett v. Board of Pension
Comm'rs, 113 N.J.L. 230, 233-34, 173 A. 923, 924-25 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd per curiam, 114 N.J.
L. 273, 176 A. 341 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935).
Is 91 N.J. at 59, 449 A.2d at 1265 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
151Id. at 60, 449 A.2d at 1266 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). Justice O'Hern pointed out that the
statute upon which Mrs. Eyers' claim for benefits was based, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:15A-50 (West
Cum. Supp. 1983-1984), stated that "[ulpon [the employee's] death, his retirement allowance
shall be continued throughout the life of and paid to" the designated beneficiary. 91 N.J. at 59,
449 A.2d at 1265 (emphasis added). The dissent viewed the phrase "shall be continued" as
implying that a pensioner must himself be entitled to receive benefits before any payments could
be "continued" to his beneficiary. See 91 N.J. at 60, 449 A.2d at 1266 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
150
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Justice O'Hern went on to criticize the majority's finding of a
57
legislative concern for the welfare of dependents such as Mrs. Eyers.'
He pointed out that the statute under which Mrs. Eyers claimed her
right to benefits conferred that right merely because of a person's
status as designated beneficiary, and did not evince a particular legislative concern for widows per se. 15 The dissent found the other
statutes cited by the majority, such as the section of the pension statute
providing for survivor's benefits to dependents where a public employee has been killed while on duty, simply inapplicable to the facts
in Eyers.'5 9 Justice O'Hern concluded by stating that both the granting and the forfeiture of pension benefits should be done equitably,
and that the conduct of the employee is the factor which guides those
decisions.' 60 The majority's decision, he noted, brought about the
"unconscionable" result that widows such as Mrs. Eyers would receive
benefits while widows of other public employees would not, based
solely on the fact that the latter group of pensioners had "lived to see
[their] benefits forfeited before . . . death."'1'

The Uricoli and Eyers decisions have reinforced the New Jersey
courts' position that public employees' rights to their pension benefits
combine elements of both the gratuity and the contractual theories.
While expanding on prior decisions which recognized that public
62
employees had a limited property interest in their pension benefits,'

151

91 N.J. at 60-61, 449 A.2d at 1266 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).

58 Id. at 61, 449 A.2d at 1266 (O'Hern, J., dissenting); see N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 43:15A-50
(West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); see supra note 156.
159See 91 N.J. at 60-61, 449 A.2d at 1266 (O'Hern, J., dissenting); see N.J. STAT. ANN. §
43:15A-49 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984); supra note 148. The dissent also rejected the majority's reliance by analogy on N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-2 (West 1962), which provides in part:
that nothing herein contained shall prevent the payment of the pension for the sole
benefits of the mother, father, wife or minor children of the person . . . confined in a
penal institution if the board or commission administering the pension fund shall
determine that such pension is necessary for their maintenance.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-2 (West 1962).
Justice O'Hern maintained that the purpose of the statute was primarily to prevent duplication
of payments and not, as the majority asserted, to provide for dependents of public employees. 91
N.J. at 60, 449 A.2d at 1266 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
"0 91 N.J. at 62, 449 A.2d at 1267 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
161Id. at 61-62, 449 A.2d at 1266 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
1'2 See 91 N.J. at 71-76, 449 A.2d at 1272-75; see also supra notes 42-46 and accbmpanying
text. By requiring application of the balancing test, the Uricoli court has implied that public
employees have a property interest in the totality of their pension benefits rather than merely in
their pension contributions and individual installments. See Moran v. Firemen's & Policemen's
Pension Fund Comm'n, 20 N.J. Misc. 479, 28 A.2d 885 (Hudson County Cir. Ct. 1942) (vested
right to pension installments payable); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:16A-3 (West Cum. Supp. 19831984) (refund of members' individual contributions upon resignation or dismissal).
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the Uricoli court did not raise such rights to a contractual level. This
approach provides greater pension security to employees while allowing the pension plan administrators to retain forfeiture of benefits as a
deterrent to misconduct.1 63 The court did not, however, clearly resolve the question of when or if a working member of a New Jersey
public pension plan ever becomes indefeasibly entitled to pension
benefits.
New Jersey courts have consistently held that retired public employees have "vested" rights to any pension installment which has
become payable. 164 The legislature has also statutorily provided for
the refund of members' contributions upon withdrawal from the systems, with no distinction between the member's voluntary or involuntary separation from service.'6 5 Apparently, however, in the New
16391 N.J. at 77-78, 449 A.2d at 1275-76; see supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. A
number of states, either through constitutional or statutory provisions, have made public employees' pension rights contractual in nature. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 7 (membership in municipal pension systems contractual); ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. XIII, § 5 (same); MICH.
CONST. art. 9, § 24 (same); N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7 (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, §
25(5) (West 1966) (same). Once the contractual nature of the relationship has been established,
the United States Constitution prohibits any state action which would impair that contract. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10; see, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (state's
ability to modify contracts limited by contract clause); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497
(1965) (same); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (states may not legislatively
impair contractual obligations). Some state courts have construed applicable constitutional
provisions as providing vested pension rights only at retirement, thus allowing modification of
public pension plans with respect to working members. See Chun v. Employees' Retirem. Sys.,
607 P.2d 415 (Hawaii 1980) (construing HAWAII CONST. of 1978, art. XVI, § 2) (pension benefits
vest on date of retirement); In re Enrolled Senate Bill 1269, 389 Mich. 659, 209 N.W.2d 200
(1973) (construing MIcH. CONST. art. IX, § 24) (increase in contributions by active members not
impairment of vested pension rights). California has attempted to create a middle ground in
construing public pension rights as contractual obligations while at the same time maintaining
that the members have impliedly consented to reasonable modifications to those plans. See Betts
v. Board of Educ., 21 Cal. 3d 859, 582 P.2d 614, 148 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1978) (state's contractual
obligations to public pension plans may be reasonably modified); Miller v. State, 18 Cal. 3d 808,
557 P.2d 970, 135 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1977) (same); Wallace v.City of Fresno, 42 Cal. 2d 180, 265
P.2d 884 (1954) (same); Dryden v. Board of Pension Comm'rs, 6 Cal. 2d 575, 59 P.2d 104 (1936)
(same). Other states, such as New York, which have created contractual pension plan relationships in their constitutions, are faced with the task of amending the constitution in order to effect
new provisions in their public pension plans. Such modifications affect only those employees
entering the system after enactment of the amendments. See Birnbaum v. New York State
Teachers Retirem. Sys., 5 N.Y.2d 1, 152 N.E.2d 241, 176 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1958) (construing N.Y.
CONST. art. V, § 7) (legislative modification of pension benefits after employee enters system
prohibited). Thus, modification of the public pension plans, as well as application of the
forfeiture doctrine, would have been severely restricted had the court imbued New Jersey's
public employee pension benefits with contractual rights.
4 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:15A-41 and :16A-11 (West Cum. Supp. 1983-1984) (provision
for refund of pension fund contributions). A member's right to obtain such a refund has not
always existed. See Connelly v. Municipal Employees Pension Comm'n, 130 N.J.L. 101, 31 A.2d
488 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (dismissed revenue clerk denied refund of pension plan contributions).

1983]

NOTE

Jersey public pension systems, working members' pension benefits do
not vest prior to retirement except to the limited extent provided by
the early retirement statutes. 66
The Uricoli court's inclusion of the "extent to which the employee's pension has vested" 67 as a factor to be considered in the determination of forfeiture therefore appears to be inapplicable to cases involving public employees who are currently working. Had the court
simply held that all public employees have vested rights in their
pension benefits once the minimum eligibility requirements of age and
length of service had been met, as suggested by Justice Schreiber's
concurrence in Eyers,6 8 it would have eliminated the need for the
application of the balancing process in cases where the misconduct
took place after those requirements had been fulfilled. The pension
boards' future determinations would have been simplified by a holding that in such cases, conviction for misconduct involving moral
turpitude only ends the employee's entitlement to pension benefits
accruing after the date of the incident. The deterrent function of
forfeiture would still be served by this approach, since the pension
rights of employees which had not vested prior to their misconduct
would presumably still be subject to total forfeiture. A clear holding
with regard to vesting would at the same time have advanced the
legislative goal of ensuring financial security in retirement for public
employees and their families.
The judicial development of the forfeiture doctrine as a means of
enforcing, and in essence defining, the honorable service requirement
of the pension statutes 9 has had the apparent approval of the legislature, since those statutes have not been amended regarding either
forfeiture or honorable service. 70 The legislature has not, in fact,

See supra note 122.
91 N.J. at 78, 449 A.2d at 1276.
See 91 N.J. at 58-59, 449 A.2d at 1265.
'6 See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
170 See Procaccino, 87 N.J. at 272, 432 A.2d at 1349-50 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Since the
original enactment of public employees' and police and firemen's pension legislation in 1962,
there have been a substantial number of amendments to the plans. See, e.g., L. 1971, c. 213, eff.
June 17, 1971 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:15 and :15A);
and L. 1981, c. 177, eff. June 19, 1981 (codified as amended in N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:15A-38,
:16A-11.2). The legislature has not, however, modified the judicially developed concepts of
honorable service and the forfeiture doctrine. 87 N.J. at 272, 432 A.2d at 1349-50 (Clifford, J.,
dissenting). The acquiescence of the legislature to these formulations indicates that the judicial
construction of the pension statutes is in accord with legislative intent. Id. (Clifford, J., dissenting); see Lemke v. Bailey, 41 N.J. 295, 301, 196 A.2d 523, 526 (1963) (judicial construction of
tolling statute supported by legislature's inaction).
' '

',
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provided any specific guidance as to how or when application of the
forfeiture doctrine is warranted, or as to what constitutes honorable
service. In permitting the pension boards the discretion to determine
the parameters of honorable service, the legislature has to a certain
degree abdicated its function of policy formation in the area. The
guidelines enumerated by the Uricoli court, which include a wide
range of factors for the boards to consider when processing pension
applications, 17 ' will allow the pension boards even broader discretion
in deciding when forfeiture of pension benefits is warranted. The
language of the decision does not, however, mandate consideration of
any minimum number of the listed factors, nor does it indicate the
relative weight to be accorded each factor. 72 If length of service is a
primary consideration, at what point will the balance be tipped in
favor of forfeiture when the employee has amassed, for example, over
forty years of service? Will one sufficiently heinous incident be adequate to warrant forfeiture, or must the board find several other
detrimental factors in order to overcome the weight of an extended
term of otherwise honorable service?
The flexibility of the guidelines may well result in uneven application. For example, it would appear that, in considering all circumstances of a given case as required by the Uricoli court, a pension
board could compel forfeiture on the basis of incidents for which a
member had been indicted, but never convicted, thus circumventing
the "innocent until proven guilty" presumption of our criminal justice
system. The quasi-judicial nature of the pension boards would also
expand, since it seems that evidentiary hearings would be necessary in
order to determine the employee's "motives and reasons" for his
action, to establish the connection between the offense and the position, and to ascertain the employee's "other personal circumstances,"
all of which apparently must be considered by pension boards, under
the guidelines set out in Uricoli, in determining the extent of forfeiture
required in a given case.' 7
The court further complicated the pension boards' task in future
forfeiture cases by its holding in Eyers that survivor's benefits of public
employee's pensions are neither dependent upon nor derived from the
member's benefits, but that the forfeiture criteria developed in Uricoli
would nonetheless apply to such beneficiaries.174 If Mrs. Eyers' surviSee 91 N.J. at 77-78, 449 A.2d at 1275-76; see supra note 110.
See 91 N.J. at 78, 449 A.2d at 1276.
...Id. at 77-78, 449 A.2d at 1275-76.
174 91 N.J. at 56, 58, 449 A.2d at 1264, 1265. The decision indicated that factors in addition to
those formulated in Uricoli were to be considered when determining forfeiture of survivor's
17

171
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vor's benefits were not derived from her husband's pension benefits, it
would seem that any forfeiture would be unwarranted since Mrs.
Eyers herself had committed no act upon which any reduction could
be based. Indeed, if survivor's benefits are truly independent from
those of the plan members, the application of the forfeiture doctrine
to any extent would seem unjustified regardless of the beneficiary's
relationship to the employee. The benefits could simply be granted
based on the designated beneficiary's status as a survivor.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Uricoli attempted to set out
comprehensive guidelines to be followed by public pension boards in
determining the extent of pension benefit forfeiture required in cases
involving public employee misconduct. The flexibility of those guidelines may foster equitable results, while obviating the need for the
extended judicial processes formerly required in situations involving
employee misconduct or moral turpitude. That same flexibility, however, as well as the failure of the court to address the question of if and
when public employee pension benefits actually vest, may in fact
create additional confusion and increase the administrative workload
involved in processing applications for those benefits. The need for a
definitive, comprehensive policy statement by the legislature regarding the pension benefits of public employees has never been more
evident.
Janet Pruden Bright

benefits. Id. at 56, 449 A.2d at 1264. The court did not, however, specifically identify those
factors. Id.

